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 To analyse the factors that influence how long a worker would be trapped on 
minimum wage in Portugal, a survival and a hazard rate analysis were applied. The results 
indicate that the worker experience a short duration and that a negative duration dependence 
exists. Minimum wage continues to affect more women, with a lower school level. The 
estimates indicate that those who belong to the manufacturing sector and to a district with a 
higher Kaitz index, experience a smaller hazard rate. The destinations of exit demonstrated 

















Minimum wages (MW) were imposed in Portugal in 1974, for the first time. An 
argument used to increase the MW is that without the imposition supported by law, the 
earning MW workers will never get back their purchasing power. However the argument used 
by the people that are against this increase, is that this is just a temporary wage, because 
young people can gain some practical experience and then jump to another job or situation 
with a better wage. Those arguments raise one question: for how long would a MW worker 
receive it? 
More recently, Portugal has been faced an IMF intervention in which some issues 
about the Portuguese labour market were raised. In the IMF Memorandum of Understanding 
it can be read “Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) to improve the employability of the 
young and disadvantaged categories and ease labour market mismatches.” The disadvantage 
categories are precisely the ones, which are more willing to receive the MW. Understanding 
which factors make a person receive the MW during more time will help us to understand 
what they do to get out of this situation faster. 
An argument many times used is that an increase in the MW decreases the inequality 
of income inside one society. This argument is used because one normally associates a MW 
worker to a certain profile, which generally belongs to the most unfavorable social stratum. In 
this study it will be defined a MW worker profile and what the characteristics of a MW 
worker are. 
In this study, five questions will be raised: i) would a worker be stuck on MW?; ii) 
how does the MW duration influence the exit likelihood?; iii) is the probability of exit 
conditioned by the type of destination?; iv) how do the characteristics of a worker influence 
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his MW duration?; v) would firm characteristics and the surrounding society influence the 
worker hazard rate? 
This work will be structured in four sections. In the first one it is done a review of the 
existing literature. The second one is on data and data analysis, where a database is presented 
and a basic statistical analysis of the used data is done. On the third one the model used will 
be discussed, and in the last one there will be a discussion of the obtained results, comparing 
those with the literature review done above. 
2) Literature Review 
 The discussion about the MW and its effects on society started at long time ago but 
nowadays, with the availability of the statistical data and the econometric methods, more 
studies on this matter were being conducted. This is particularly evident on the last two 
decades of the last century. One famous paper on this issue is the one did by Card and 
Krueger (1993) about the effects of an increase in the MW in one state of the United States 
(US). They have found that the MW could be increased without provoking an increase in the 
unemployment at the same time. They also found that the prices increased on the state which 
applied the MW increase, but not on the sectors of the economy that were more affected by it. 
 A reflection of the Portuguese labour market rigidity is evidenced in the work of 
Portugal et al. (2006). In that study the authors found that when the MW increases the job 
separations between the young earners decrease, so they are now more willing to keep the 
same job, this constitutes a particular case. It is supported by studies like Eckstein’s (2011), 




 The imposition by law in MW increase is also a factor that could influence the 
probability of a worker leaving the MW. It is normally argued that this imposition restores the 
purchasing power lost due to inflation: now all employees in the labour market will 
experience a wage growth. Smith (1992) alerts for the fact that there are people who will be 
stuck on the unemployment and on this new MW because their characteristics are not good 
enough to keep them employed or to improve their wages. 
 Akyeampong (1989) studied the application of MW in Canada. He argued that the 
MW was implemented because the politicians and governors of Canada wanted to create a 
tool for economic stabilization. The MW is needed to minimize the wage gap between 
unionized workers and non-unionized workers, and as a tool that would work to minimize 
inequality and poverty. To understand what the effect of applying the MW policy is, 
Akyeampong typified a Canadian MW worker profile. He found that the profile that fitted the 
MW worker better is the young female with low education, non-unionized, coming from a 
metropolitan area or not, but that would probably work on a part-time job in a small firm on 
the services sector, probably in the accommodation, food or beverage services industry. 
 These findings go in the same direction as those found by Sussman et al. (2004), who 
applyed a statistical analysis of the characteristics of MW workers and found that they are in 
general women and poorly educated people, not unionized, that work with a temporary work 
contract in non-tradable sectors (food and accommodation). They also brought up to the 
discussion of the place where the MW workers live and found that a large fraction live with 
their parents, which could be due to their age or be related to their lack of money in order to 
achieve emancipation. 
 It was also found in the empirical literature that the age is a very important factor 
when discussing the MW. Carrington et al. (1999) did an analysis with students during ten 
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years after leaving school. They identified that women with young children, less educated 
people and people who live outside the metropolitan areas are much more likely to receive the 
MW, at least on the 10 years after finishing the school. After leaving school the youngsters 
enter on the labour market, according to Even et al. (2003), new comers to the labour market 
are much more likely to be MW workers but have also a bigger probability of leaving that 
state. They also found that the worker mobility matters. They conclude that when a worker 
changes of industry or job his wage improves, this effect is more relevant when the worker 
has a low training job. 
 The job turnover is an important issue when dealing with MW, the problem is that 
MW could be difficult to find if the MW is too high. According to Hall (1982) MW jobs are 
easy to find but they do not have a long duration, though an increase in MW improves the job 
turnover instead of increasing the duration of the MW. In Holzer et al. (2004) it can be seen 
that low wage jobs have a high turnover and that most of the times it is the job mobility which 
gives the worker the opportunity of experiencing a higher wage. Eckstein (2011) related job 
mobility with an increase on wage and found that job turnover explains 40% to 50% of the 
wage increase of MW earners. On his work, he also found that increasing the MW does not 
have any expression on the wage distribution and unemployment rates. 
 Long (1999) applied the theory of human capital - according to which on the first 
years of his career the employee is in training - to the MW. He argued that with a higher MW 
some of this initial training would be lost, reducing the potential wage increase. It would be 
the explanation to a new worker who had entered on the labour market receiving a low wage, 
he needs to get some experience. Smith et al. (1992) found that 60% of the workers who enter 
on the labor market on a given year are earning a higher wage a year later, with a raise of 20% 
on average. To those authors the workers who do not experience a wage increase have a lack 
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of schooling which prevents them to earn a higher wage. Long (1999) also did a comparison 
between regions, where the author concluded that regions with a lower level of schooling 
experience lower wage gains. 
 As it was suggested by Carrington et al. (2001), the great majority of workers change 
to a higher wage jobs during his career. On the initial stages of their careers is when the wage 
growth experienced is larger, it is suggested that if this wage increase is not experienced the 
worker could be left behind (Carrington et al., 2001). So, if one worker receives an initial 
wage higher than the MW, he will have much less probability of receiving MW in the future. 
 Gender inequality is also revealed on the MW earner characteristics. As mentioned by 
Rubery et al. (2011) women are much more likely than men to be employed in sectors 
characterized by paying low wages, because they continued being much more affected by 
family issues than men and also face a lower work mobility. They also alert to the women 
lower bargaining power and that the women are sometimes affected by employer monopsony. 
 Education is also correlated with the level of monthly income. Ashenfelter et al. 
(1999), for example, did a research on the matter and found that the returns of schooling for 
some subgroups of workers are higher than the average, particularly to those considered as 
belonging to the disadvantages categories. 
 Employer characteristics also have an effect on the probability of a worker receives a 
wage above MW one day. Holzer et al. (2004) did the bridge between the employer and 
employee characteristics. They found that the employer characteristics affect the earning 
statues of his workers, and this effect is larger when the firm fixed effect is introduced. Brown 
et al. (1989) argued that the employer size matters, showing that larger firms pay more to their 
employees, particularly to those who are considered low wage workers, than small firms, 
despite the place those people occupy in the company. 
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3) Data and data analysis 
The data used in this work is from a subsample of Quadros de Pessoal (annual survey 
or mandatory answering) database, from Ministério do Trabalho, Solidariedade e Segurança 
Social (MTSS), which is the most complete database in Portugal when we are dealing with 
salaries. Quadros de Pessoal regime is defined in Decreto-Lei no 123/2002, and it is a 
compilation of the information which all companies/firms are required to provide, on 
employees and salary levels. 
The period covered by this study is between 1994 and 2013, which is a fraction of the 
period covered by our database Quadros de Pessoal. During that time interval there was one 
year, 2001, when, for reasons which could not be controlled, the information was not gathered 
and treated properly.  
The database from Quadros de Pessoal has one problem, it includes not only the 
individuals that had started to work on 1994 but also the workers who were already working. 
Thus looking only to the individuals that were receiving the MW in 1994, workers that started 
to earn the MW some years before could be included. For this type of workers it could not be 
estimated correctly how many years they were earning the MW, problems with censored data 
could be found. The data could be left censored, as showed above or be right censored, in the 
case of an individual continuing or starting with the MW in 2013. Again, there is not any 
basis to measure the total duration correctly. 
Due to this problem, and trying to avoid unnecessary complications, only the 
individuals that had begun to earn the MW with less than a year of tenure were chosen, to be 
tracked. Thus, all the individuals earning the MW, with less than a year of tenure in the 
company, are those that are included in the sample and permit to measure the beginning of the 
spell precisely. In relation to the right censoring, the analysis will drop out of the sample those 
9 
 
individuals that started to be followed in 2013. For those who remain on the MW it will only 
be known that in 2013 the individuals continued receiving the MW, not knowing precisely 
when they would leave that stage. According to Jenkins (2005), it will be experienced the 
Type I censoring, where a sample was followed for a certain time (from 1994 to 2013) and the 
number of exits is random but the duration observed is fixed.  
On this database the CAE – Rev. 3 form the INE, with 2 digits was applied. 
3.1) Definition of minimum wage earner 
Nowadays with the part time workers boom, some workers have now more than one 
job. Thus one possibility was to study not the monthly wage but the hourly wage. In fact in 
this research sample the part time workers were residual and relatively recent. Because of that 
it was decided to work only with the monthly wage, as the purpose of this work is to study the 
monthly MW duration. Including part time workers could also bias the results, particularly for 
those with short duration, because they normally have part time jobs to complement other 
income, in particular, the monthly allowance given by their parents. 
 In Portugal the MW appeared in 1974. After 1974 the governments gained the 
responsibility of proposing discretionary MW increases, usually with the consultation of 
employers and workers representatives. The MW in Portugal covers all workers aged 16 or 
more, excluding agricultural and house-hold services (Cardoso et al., 2006). In the period 
covered by this study, according to our database, 19 wage increases, summarized on table 1, 
occurred. 
Looking to this resume table, one can see that year after year the incidence of the MW 
on the sample increased. That situation could be explained by the fact that year after year it 
was more difficult to leave the MW stage, thus the new workers who entered on the labour 
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market receiving the MW would be added to the people who were already on the MW. As it 
could be seen the incidence of the MW is larger on the more recent level of the MW and is 
responsible for more than 20% of the sample.  
 On the original database there was not a variable that could identify the MW earner, so 
a new variable was created to identify if the worker is receiving the MW in that year or not. In 
order to know that, other two variables included on the sample were used, the base 
remuneration and the minimum wage. The first variable represents the base salary of the 
worker and the other identified what the MW in a determined year was. So one could be able 
to know exactly who the workers receiving the MW were, it was decided to mark those 
receiving a base salary equal to the MW. 1 
As said above, this study focused on the earnings mobility of a MW worker. To 
understand and measure this, it would be needed to define a break point where it could be said 
that the worker was no more on the MW. That point of transition would not influence the 
qualitative results that would be achieved. A test with a 10 € difference2, and with a relative 
difference through time of 2.5% was done. The 2.5% as its break point was chosen because it 





                                                             
1 Given that the workers do not receive a salary precisely equal to the MW all months, we to mark them gave a 
margin of more or less 1 euro, in order to avoid having workers leaving from the MW because of rounding 
errors. 
2 We also did the tests for an increase of 10 euro the results are very similar but are not consistent through time 
because a 10 euro increase has much more weight on the MW of the beginning years of our sample. In spite of 
not having any support for that on the literature review we decide to use the 2.5% increase. 
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MW evolution through time 
 
Table 1 – Minimum wage – General Regime. Computed by the author. 
During his working life, one could receive different wages, sometimes those wages 
could be higher than the others before but sometimes they could be lower. This implies that 
some workers could leave the stage of MW and return to it after a few years. In this study, 
only the first spell is retained. 
What was observed in the sample was that the largest part of workers had left the MW 
on the first spell and never got back on it. 3 Looking at the period it occurred (duration - dur), 
(see figure 1), it could be seen that the largest part of MW earners had left that state on the 
first years receiving the MW. It could also be seen that after one year receiving the MW more 
                                                             
3 On this work the results found are only based on the first spell. 
Year of Minimum Wage 
reference - General Regime Total
1994 245,9 20 824
1995 259,4 25 206
1996 272,3 25 046
1997 282,8 31 295
1998 293,8 32 880
1999 305,8 36 719
2000 318,2 40 523
2002 348 39 594
2003 356,6 41 504
2004 365,6 43 751
2005 374,7 52 310
2006 385,9 53 814
2007 403 62 266
2008 426 68 416
2009 450 67 146
2010 475 70 467
2011 485 74 616
2012 485 71 165
2013 485 85 653
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than 50% of the workers had left that stage remaining only those who because of their 
characteristics would not be able to experience a higher wage (Smith et al., 1992). 4 
Different spells 
 
Table 2 – Different spells observed in our sample. Computed by the author. 
The data had also been treated in order to understand the destinations of the exit, if 
remaining on the same firm earning a higher wage or if one had to change to a new one to get 
a wage increase. Thus, the MW earners were divided in two categories5: i) the ones that leave 
the MW because they change of firm, and ii) the ones that move away from MW because they 
get a wage increase, remaining on the same company. 
3.2) The variables 
 In this section the individual specific variables intended to control for individual 
characteristics are discussed. Typical variables should be taken into account when studying 
individuals, as age6 and education7, so they were present on the model. The variable age was 
here defined between 16 and 64 years old, with the majority part of the individuals being on 
                                                             
4 See figure 1 
5 On the data are also those that just move out of the sample but it isn’t known what destination they took, 
because of that the results presented here will not include this type of MW workers, which are treated as 
censored. 
6 On the model age will be reflected as set of a dummy variables, with the individuals grouped by age. 













the interval until 30, which was according Carrington et al (2001) and Akyeampong (1989), 
who related the youngest people to the MW. 
 Other characteristic highlighted on the literature was also controlled tenure, here 
reflected on the duration (log dur) of the MW stage, given the definition of duration pointed 
above. Controlling for tenure allowed us to understand if remaining or not more time on the 
company receiving the MW increased the probability of a higher wage in the future (in 
duration dependence). It reflected the results found on the literature review, in Hall (1982) 
and Holzer et al. (2004), where the authors related the increase on wage with the job turnover 
which is characterized by a short tenure. Other variable that was highlighted on the literature 
was the nationality of the individual. Here the data did not allow to study that. 8 
 The firm specific chosen variables were also related to what was highlighted on our 
literature review. 9 A factor that could contribute to a worker not to receive the MW was the 
type of capital owner, if it was public or private. Finally the sector in which the company 
operates would be controlled 
 For policy purposes, a new variable was computed, Kaits Index, computed at the 
district level, which was generated having as base the MW in the individual district divided 
by the median wage on that district. With this variable, district and economy wide specific 
effects could be controlled, enabling to know the influence of that factor on the transition of 
the individual to a higher wage. 
 
 
                                                             
8 Using our sample is not possible to know the worker nationality to all years. 
9 We also tried to control for the size of the company, using the variable people (number of workers working on 
the company) but it was not defined for the all sample. 
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4) The model 
 Suppose that time is divided into j intervals[𝑇0, 𝑇1), [𝑇1, 𝑇2), … , [𝑇𝑗−1, ∝). The data is 
observed on a discrete time basis, 𝑇 ∈ (1, … , 𝑗), where T = t represents an exit on the interval 
[𝑇𝑡−1, 𝑇𝑡). 
 The survival function returns the probability of an individual survive in 𝑇𝑡+1, given 
that he has survived until 𝑇𝑗, is defined as (Addison and Portugal, 2008),  
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) =  ∏𝑧=1
𝑡 [1 − ℎ(𝑧)], t = 1,2, …, j-1. 
Where h(j), represents the hazard function, which gives the probability of exit in time 
𝑇𝑗conditional to the individual survive until time 𝑇𝑗−1,defined as, 
ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡) 
An extension of the proportional hazard model to discrete time is, 
𝑆(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑆0(𝑡)
exp (𝑥′𝑖𝛽), 
Where 𝑆(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) returns the probability if individual i with covariates 𝑥𝑖survive until time t and 
𝑆0(𝑡) represents the baseline survival function, where the covariates equal to zero.  
 The complementary log log hazard function is a discrete time proportional hazard 
model. Using the relationship between the hazard and the survival functions, we can write, 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = 1 − [1 − ℎ0(𝑡)]
exp (𝑥′𝑖𝛽) 
 Duration dependence will be accounted for via the inclusion of log duratias as an 
additional covariate. It will also be presented the Kaplan-Meier Survival Function. 
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 A possible problem that creates a bias on the hazard function estimates is the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity (UIH). This problem is reflected on the quickness that an 
individual leave from one state to another. If some individuals leave from one state more 
quickly than others, in the end only the less prepared workers will remain and the estimates 
will be biased. It shows that the individuals have a different hazard rate. 
 To deal with that, two types of models will be estimated.10 The first type is the 
parametric approach, where a multiplicative term v, to capture the UIH is included (Jenkins, 
2005). If v is above average the individual leave faster, if v is below average the individual 
leave slower, defined as, 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋|𝑣) = 1 − [1 − ℎ0(𝑡)]
exp (𝑥′𝑖𝛽)𝑣, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑣 > 0 
 The second mode, to be estimated is the mass point approach, where the sample is 
divided in two, according to the capabilities of the individual to leave the state (Jenkins, 
2005). The first group, the “hares”, have a larger intercept and will leave the MW with a 
faster rate and the second group, the “tortoises”, will leave at a slower rate. The hazard 
function could be defined as, 
Assuming a fraction of w individuals, 
ℎ1(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = 1 − [1 − ℎ0(𝑡)]
exp (𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥1𝑖+⋯+𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖) 
While, for the remaining fraction 1-w, 
ℎ2(𝑡|𝑥𝑖) = 1 − [1 − ℎ0(𝑡)]
exp (𝛽0+𝛿+𝛽1𝑥1𝑖+⋯+𝛽𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑖) 
 
                                                             
10 We also used the spilt population survival model (spsruv) where the hazard rate is equal to zero for a fraction 
of the population. 
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5) Results  
 In order to present here the different hazard rates through time, the Kaplan – Meier 
estimate was computed (see figure 1). Here it could be seen that the largest majority of the 
workers had left the MW stage until the fifth year receiving it, and that more than 50% had 
left the MW after the first year receiving it. 
Kaplan – Meier estimation 
 
Figure 1 – Kaplan – Meier survival and failure estimates, not having in attention the different types of 
destinations. Computed by the author. 
 To understand what the drivers of minimum wage persistence are, it was first 
presented a base model (Model 1, see table 3), to which the variables described above were 
added, in order to understand their power and the effects of the base variables. The results 
showed that an individual with a higher tenure had less probability of leaving the MW. If the 
duration increased in one percent the hazard rate of leaving the MW became smaller by 0,563 
percent, ceteris paribus. Thus, a negative duration dependence is observed. Gender 
discrimination was also verified. A male worker had a much higher probability, close to 17%, 
ceteris paribus, of leaving the MW than a female. These results had met what was referred by 






















 It could also be seen that the age group matters, for those who were less than 20 years 
age, it was not considered to be a factor that could prevent a wage increase. For all other age 
groups, the age would decrease their probability of exiting, comparing to those who had more 
than 55 years. The size of this effect change between age groups, the effect of the groups that 
were at the end was smaller than the groups that were middle aged. For those who belong to 
an age group between 21 (inclusive) and 50 (inclusive) the effect was very similar, showing 
that after a certain age the effect has remained constant.  
 Confronting those findings with literature review, it could be seen that, Even et al 
(2003) found that the young people after finishing school and entering in the labour market 
had much higher probability to receive the MW but had also much higher probability of 
leaving that state. In our results, when the worker got older the probability of getting a higher 
wage decreased, until he achieved a determined (older than 45 years) age group. Akyeampong 
(1989) and Sussman et al. (2004), related the persistence of the MW with the fact of being 
young and women, precisely the results found in this study. 
 Carrington et al. (1999) identified that less educated people, particularly women with 
young children, were more willing to earn the MW, and Smith et al. (1992), who, as said 
above, related this MW duration with the lack of schooling, following the results found in 
Portugal, there was less probability of being apart from the MW if people were less educated. 
The results showed that less educated individuals with basic, for example, have a smaller 
probability of leaving the MW by 28.9 log points, ceteris paribus, than a worker with a 
college degree. 
 The variable that captured how binding the MW is, the Kaitz index, showed that its 
effect mattered. Looking at the results, this effect is large and statistical significant, an 
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increase of 0.1 on the Kaitz index returned a smaller, in less 7.17%, probability of exit, ceteris 
paribus. 
 Model 2 (see table 3) started to include some of the firm specific variables chosen. It 
could be seen that the results found on the Model 1 remained almost the same, keeping the 
size of the effect practically constant. Thus, focusing only on those two variables, it could be 
seen that when a worker works on a public owned firm his probability of exit is reduced by 
5%, ceteris paribus, instead if the worker belongs to a foreign owned firm, he could see his 
probability of exiting increased by 7%, ceteris paribus. The results agreed to those found by 
Holzer et al. (2004), it was argued that the owner is a strong determiner of the earning level of 
the workers. 
 Sussman et al. (2004), and Akyeampong (1989) identified the food and 
accommodation sectors as being sectors characterized by having MW workers. The model 
presented also account for that factor (see model 3). The size effects of the other variables, 
already analyzed, remained approximately the same. 
 Those sector specific variables indicated that working on determined sectors was 
relevant to exit or not the MW faster. When looking to the Portuguese case, the 
manufacturing sector could be identified as being the one from which it was more difficult to 
leave, with a probability of exit smaller by 11.3 log points, ceteris paribus, comparing to those 
who work in other services. The sector of food and accommodation revealed also a statistical 
significance but had a very small effect. To a person who works on the food and 
accommodation sector the probability of exit is only smaller by 2.82%, comparing to a worker 
who belonged to the other services, ceteris paribus. The construction sector does not have any 




Complementary Log-log estimation results 
 
Table 3 – Cloglog estimation results. 11 Computed by the author. 
                                                             
11 See table 1 in annex for variables description. 
Cloglog Cloglog Cloglog
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
log duration -0.563*** -0.563*** -0.556***
(0.00568) (0.00569) (0.00569)
basic -0.289*** -0.288*** -0.270***
(0.0131) (0.0131) (0.0131)
secondary -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.178***
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0134)
age ≤ 20 -0.00762 -0.00926 0.00603
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0118)
21 ≤ age ≤ 25 -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.108***
(0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113)
26 ≤ age ≤ 30 -0.168*** -0.169*** -0.162***
(0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0116)
31 ≤ age ≤ 35 -0.148*** -0.149*** -0.142***
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
36 ≤ age ≤ 40 -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.134***
(0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0124)
41 ≤ age ≤ 45 -0.125*** -0.125*** -0.120***
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
46 ≤ age ≤ 50 -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.106***
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0136)
51 ≤ age ≤ 55 -0.0557*** -0.0561*** -0.0539***
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146)
male 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.168***
(0.00409) (0.00410) (0.00418)
foreign firm 0.0715*** 0.0786***
(0.0107) (0.0107)
public firm -0.0522*** -0.0714***
(0.0132) (0.0133)
kaitz index -0.717*** -0.704*** -0.604***
(0.0213) (0.0214) (0.0221)






year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 1.508*** 1.498*** 1.427***
(0.0262) (0.0262) (0.0265)
Observations 466,021 466,021 466,021
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  Models controlling for UIH were also estimated. The Stata functions used, 
pgmhaz812 and hshaz13, were not able to differentiate those who exit faster, the “hares”, from 
those who leave slower, the “tortoises”. Different models and also variables tests were done to 
try to detect some variable specific problem. In the end, the model continued to converge to 
the cloglog model presented above. However, this time with the difference between the two 
hazard rates: on the hshaz case, and the variance of the Gamma Distribution, on the pgmhaz8 
case, tending to zero. Those results indicate that the chosen variables capture the 
heterogeneity between individuals adequately. 
Kaplan – Meier estimation for different destinations 
 
Figure 2 – Kaplan – Meier survival estimates. Those who have as exit destination same firm are at left, 
and those who have as exit destination other firm are at right. 
On figure 2, it is computed the Kaplan – Meier estimate, it shows that the workers 
who exit of MW remaining on the same firm have a smaller hazard rate than the workers who 
exit of MW changing of firm. The result shows that it was easier to an individual to leave the 
MW changing of the firm than remaining in the same. The graph also permits to verify that 
the negative duration dependence was observed, again, but now it was less accentuated than 
before. 
                                                             
12 Parametrical approach estimator, with gamma frailty. 
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 Regarding the different destinations of exit a mass point approach14 was applied (see 
table 4). The model only was capable to split the population for those who remained on the 
company, where 70% of the sample have a zero hazard rate. The results demonstrate that, for 
those who exit the MW and remain on the same company, tenure is valued. Tenure is 
observed on the duration variable, given the definition above. It could be seen that, when the 
worker increases his MW duration in one percent, his hazard rate increases by 0.117%, ceteris 
paribus. Thus, a positive duration dependence is verified for this destination. 
 The results achieved for male and education variables remain similar to those found 
above. However, the size of the education effect is larger, for example, the effect of having 
basic education almost doubles. Age is a variable that could help the MW earner, as the model 
indicates, when the worker changes to other age group, he increases his likelihood of exit, 
until the 40 years old. The Kaitz index was a powerful variable with an increase of 0.1 
provoking a raise of 10% on the exit likelihood. 
 When controlling for the type of capital, it could be seen that, again, working on a 
public owned firm, decreases the likelihood of experience a wage increase by 16.9 log points, 
ceteris paribus. As mentioned above, it is easier to a foreign firm worker, to get a wage 
increase. Sector remains also an important variable to explain the MW duration. If a worker 
belongs to the food and accommodation sector, his hazard rate decrease in 22.3 log points, 
ceteris paribus. Although, if he works on the manufacturing sector his hazard rate increases by 




                                                             
14 Split population survival function. 
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Mass point approach with different destinations 
 
Table 4- Exit destinations, computed by the author15. 
                                                             





Model 1 Model 2






age ≤ 20 0.249*** -0.161***
(0.0518) (0.0240)
21 ≤ age ≤25 0.279*** 0.0546**
(0.0503) (0.0227)
26 ≤ age ≤ 30 0.150*** 0.362***
(0.0516) (0.0228)
31 ≤ age ≤ 35 0.178*** 0.512***
(0.0529) (0.0231)
36 ≤ age ≤ 40 0.165*** 0.552***
(0.0546) (0.0236)
41 ≤ age ≤ 45 0.125** 0.498***
(0.0569) (0.0244)
46 ≤ age ≤ 50 0.158*** 0.437***
(0.0594) (0.0255)




foreign firm 0.199*** 0.129***
(0.0409) (0.0179)
public firm -0.169*** -0.201***
(0.0551) (0.0220)
kaitz index 1.004*** -0.458***
(0.0936) (0.0384)






year dummies Yes Yes
Constant -2.367*** -0.367***
(0.112) (0.0476)
Intercept of susceptible individuals 0.858*** -
(0.0587)






 For those who exit moving to other firm the mass point approach does not revealed 
capable to divide the population in two (see table 4, model 2). The results reveal that those 
who see their MW duration increase by 1%, see their probability of exit changing of firm 
reduced by 1.295%, ceteris paribus. Thus, it is observed a negative duration dependence. 
 Regarding the individual characteristics one could observe that the control education 
variables have now a small coefficient, where those on secondary education experience a 
higher probability of exit comparing to those with a superior degree, ceteris paribus. Age, as 
verified on the model 1, table 4, revealed to be a facilitator of exit, now with a larger effect, 
until a certain age. Gender reveals when comparing to the other models to be a factor that 
influence the exit of MW but not the type of exit. It could be observed that its coefficient 
changes but the size effect remains almost the same. 
 In what concerns to the individual external factors, the results continue to evidence the 
paper of the owner of capital, with the foreign firm acting as an exit facilitator and the public 
firm acting as barrier. Getting a wage increase while changing of company also revealed to be 
a barrier for those who were on a district with a higher Kaitz index. According to our results 
an increase of 0.1 reduces the exit likelihood to other firm by 4.58%, ceteris paribus. The 
sector variables demonstrated to be loyalty dependent on the case of those changing to 
another firm the manufacturing sector act as barrier with a negative coefficient and larger than 
food and accommodation sector coefficient. On the case of remaining with the same company 
one could verify that the opposite happen. 
 The final result to be highlighted is the one verified on all models. The use of year 
dummies allowed us to understand how the hazard rate changes through time and, it could be 
seen that the coefficient of these year dummies increase through time, in particular on the 
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more recent years of our sample. Thus, it is demonstrated that is more and more difficult to 
exit from MW. 
6) Conclusion 
 The results of this work indicate that the MW duration in Portugal is, in general, short 
with more than 50% of the workers exiting from the MW within a year. A negative duration 
dependence is observed, it can be concluded that those who remain on the MW for several 
years have less and less probabilities of exit. This exit likelihood has also been decreasing 
through time, in particular in more recent years. 
 Looking at the different destinations, it can also be concluded that it is easier to exit 
from MW changing of firm. The results show that the hazard rate for those who remain on the 
same company is smaller than those who experience a new one. 
 Regarding to what explanatory variables indicate, one can conclude that a person 
between the 20 and the 50 years old do not experience a great variation on the hazard rate. 
Having a basic or even a secondary education contributes to remain on the MW, comparing to 
those with a college degree, ceteris paribus. Gender discrimination is also observed, being 
male increases the probability of leaving the MW salary level, in comparison with female. 
 Finally another innovation of this paper is that it can be concluded that those who live 
on a district with a higher Kaitz index, have a higher probability to continue on that salary 
level. The sector variables indicate that belonging to the sector of manufacturing is relevant to 
explain the permanence on MW, showing a negative relation between belonging to this sector 














duration Variable that returns how many years starting on the first time
has an individual stayed on minimum wage.
age Gives in each period the age of each individual on the sample. Here dummies were used.
male Standard dummy variable of gender. It assumes the value of 1
if the individual is male and 0 otherwise.
education Categorical variable of education,divided in 3 categories:
i) basic; ii) secondary and iii) college degree.
foreign firm Dummy variable that gives information about the type of ownership.
If the majority (more thatn 50%) of capital is owned by a foreign
investor/company then the variable assumes the value of 1, and
0 otherwise.
public firm Dummy variable that gives information about the type of ownership.
If the majority (more thatn 50%) of capital is owned by a public
entity then the variable assumes the value of 1, and
0 otherwise.
manufactoring Dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the individual works
on the industry sector, and 0 otherwise.
construction Dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the individual works
on the construction sector, and 0 otherwise.
food and accommodation Dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the individual works
on the catering sector, and 0 otherwise.
other services Dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the individual works
on the consulting, administrative and non-profit sectors, and 0 otherwise.
year Returns the year on which the sample was gathered. On the model dummies were used.
kaitz index Variable based on the minimum wage divided by the 
median wage on the district where the individual live.
spell Gives to us the number of times that an individual is receiving the minimum salary.
The models were computed with the first spell as base.
exit Binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the 
individual does exit the spell, this is, if the individual, for in the considered period, 
stays with a minimum-wage salary. The alternative (exit=0) is verified when 
an individual is identified, in that period, as being with minimum-wage salaries. 
Note that the individual may exit the spell with many different destinations: 
for higher paying jobs or, for any reason out of the labour market.
exit min wage same firm Binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the individual leaves the minimum 
wage to earn a higher wage remaining on the same company.
exit min wage other firm Binary variable that assumes the value 1 if the individual leaves the minimum 
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